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FOOTNOTES
1 I.R.C. § 101(a)(1).
2 Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.101-8, 1.7702-0, 1.7702-2,
1.7702A-1.
3 I.R.C. § 101(a)(2).
4 I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(B).
5 I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(A).
6 Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(2).
7 See Treas. Reg. § 1.101-1(b)(4).
8 See, e.g., Malone v. U.S., 326 F. Supp. 106 (D. Miss.
1971).
9 See I.R.C. § 101(a)(2).
10 See note 5 supra.
11 See Rev. Rul. 69-187, 1969-1 C.B. 45 (donee-transferee
paid loan); Ltr. Rul. 8027113, no date given (donee did
not pay loan).
12 See I.R.C. § 101(a)(2)(A).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
DISMISSAL. The debtor had originally filed a Chapter
12 bankruptcy case and a creditor had filed a motion for
relief from the automatic stay in that case. The debtor
discovered that the debtor was not eligible for Chapter 12
and voluntarily dismissed the Chapter 12 case and refiled
for Chapter 11. The creditor argued that Section 109(g)
prohibited the second filing within 180 days after a
voluntary dismissal of a case in which a motion for relief
from the automatic stay had been filed.  The court held that
Section 109(g) was not mandatory and that a second filing
would be allowed because the debtor did not dismiss the
first case and refile only to prevent the creditor from
obtaining relief from the automatic stay. Tooke v.
Sunshine Trust Mortgage Trust No. 86-225, 149 B.R.
687 (M.D. Fla. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors claimed an
exemption under 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) for $4,235 of the
equity in their homestead. The debtors sought avoidance of
a $300,000 second lien against the homestead as impairing
their exemption. The court held that the lien could be
avoided only to the extent of the debtors’ claimed
exemption amount. The remaining portion of the lien was
held to be subordinate to the exemption amount after
conclusion of the bankruptcy case. In re Gonzalez, 149
B.R. 9 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993).
Twelve days before filing for bankruptcy the debtor
transferred homestead property to the debtor and the
debtor’s spouse as joint tenants. The debtor and spouse
filed a joint bankruptcy case and each claimed the Maine
$60,000 homestead exemption. The homestead was subject
to a mortgage in excess of the fair market value and to two
judgment liens. No objections to the exemption claims were
filed and the debtors sought to avoid the judgment liens as
impairing the homestead exemptions. The court held that
because the judgment liens attached to the homestead
before the transfer to the spouse, the spouse could not avoid
the judgment liens.  The court also held that the debtor
could not avoid the judgment liens because the debtor had
no equity in the homestead, even if the judgment liens were
avoided. In re Saturley, 149 B.R. 245 (Bankr. D. Me.
1993).
HOMESTEAD. When a creditor attempted to levy on
real property owned by the debtor, the debtor claimed the
property eligible for a homestead exemption. The state
court denied the debtor’s claim and the creditor sought a
sale of the property. The sale was prevented by the debtor’s
bankruptcy filing, in which the debtor again claimed the
property as an exempt homestead. The creditor failed to
timely object to the exemption but objected when the debtor
sought an avoidance of the lien as impairing the exemption.
The court held that the failure to timely object to the
exemption prohibited any denial of the exemption;
however, the court also ruled that the failure to object to the
exemption did not prevent the denial of the exemption for
purposes of lien avoidance. The court also held that the
Bankruptcy Court’s denial of the avoidance because of
giving full faith and credit to the state court denial of the
exemption was improper because the debtor’s eligibility for
the exemption had to be determined as of the date of the
petition and the facts and circumstances could have
changed between the state court ruling and the filing of the
petition.  In re Morgan, 149 B.R. 147 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1993).
Under a divorce settlement, the debtor had received
money for the debtor’s interest in the marital homestead in
Michigan.  The debtor moved to Kansas and filed for
bankruptcy, claiming the money as exempt proceeds from
the sale of a homestead. The court held that because the
debtor would not have been allowed a Kansas exemption
for a Michigan homestead, the debtor could not claim a
homestead exemption from the proceeds of a Michigan
homestead. In re Sipka, 149 B.R. 181 (D. Kan. 1992).
The debtor had executed a deed of trust encumbering
the debtor’s rural homestead and had signed a waiver
asserting that the property was not the debtor’s homestead
although the property was the debtor’s residence at that
time and when the bankruptcy petition was filed.  The
secured creditor objected to the debtor’s homestead
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exemption claim, citing the waiver. The court held that
under Texas law, the waiver was ineffective to overcome
the statutory prohibition against attachments against
homesteads; therefore, the exemption was allowed. In re
Stephens, 149 B.R. 414 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992).
The court held that the IRS tax lien filed against the
debtors’ homestead remained valid where the debtors
claimed the homestead exempt in their bankruptcy case. In
re Braddock, 149 B.R. 636 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1992).
PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS. When the debtor
filed for bankruptcy, a personal injury action filed by the
debtor was pending. The debtor listed the action in the
bankruptcy schedules as an unliquidated claim but did not
claim the action as exempt. Three years later the debtor
entered into a settlement with one of the defendants which
provided for $7,000 for bodily injury and $43,000 for loss
of future income. The debtor then amended the bankruptcy
schedules to claim a $7,500 exemption for bodily injury
award, $14,091 for loss of future income award and $5,000
for loss of consortium award. The court held that (1) the
late amendment of the exemption schedules would be
allowed; (2) only $7,000 would be exempt because that was
the amount awarded for personal injury; (3) no loss of
consortium exemption would be allowed because the
judgment did not provide for loss of consortium; and (4) the
loss of future earnings exemption would be limited to the
amount needed by the debtor. In re Corbi, 149 B.R. 325
(Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1993).
TAX REFUND. The debtor claimed a post-petition
income tax refund as exempt based on the debtor’s
ownership of the survivorship interest in the refund.  The
debtor argued that because the income tax return was filed
jointly with the debtor’s nondebtor spouse, the tax refund
was tenancy by the entireties property. Only the debtor had
income subject to tax. The court held that because no
conveyance instrument operated to create a tenancy by the
entirety interest in the refund, no exemption was allowed.
In re Larish, 149 B.R. 117 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1992).
WAGES. The creditor had instituted a wage deduction
proceeding against the debtor and some of the debtor’s
wages had been withheld but no wage deduction order had
been filed by the time the debtor filed for bankruptcy. The
debtor claimed $2,000 of the wages as exempt under the
Illinois wildcard exemption and sought to avoid the
judgment lien supporting the wage deduction. The court
held that the wage deduction remains estate property
subject to the exemption until the wage deduction order has
been filed and allowed the exemption and lien avoidance.
In re Garcia, 149 B.R. 530 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).
    CHAPTER 12   
AUTOMATIC STAY. The Chapter 12 debtor had
received an usufruct (life estate) in property by gift. While
the debtor was insolvent, the debtor renounced the usufruct,
allowing the usufruct to revert to a trust for third parties.
More than one year after the renunciation was publicly
recorded, a creditor sought revocation of the renunciation.
The debtor argued that the one year statute of limitations on
actions for revocation had expired and the claim was
untimely. The creditor argued that 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) tolled
the limitations period during the bankruptcy case plus 30
days. The court held that Section 108(c) did not apply
because Section 108(c) applied only to claims against
nondebtors.  Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Vallee, 148
B.R. 1021 (W.D. La. 1992).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors filed a Chapter 13
case on December 4, 1984 and the IRS filed a claim for
personal income taxes for 1983. The debtors’ plan was
confirmed on July 19, 1985 and the plan listed the 1983
taxes but provided for no payment. The IRS made several
assessments and levies against the debtors’ property from
1984 through 1988 for taxes owed for 1984 through 1987,
including 100 percent penalties for 1982 and 1983 as
responsible persons in a corporation which failed to pay
employment taxes.  In 1989, the debtors sought recovery of
the levied property. The court held (1) the 1983 taxes were
discharged, (2) the 1984 taxes were a post-petition liability
of the debtors because the taxes were not due until April 15,
1985, (3) the 1982 and 1983 responsible person penalty
taxes were discharged because no claim was filed in the
case; (4) the IRS was required to return all property levied
against less than two years before the action for recovery
was filed; and (5) the levies for the 1982, 1983 and 1984
taxes and penalties violated the automatic stay, entitling the
debtors to return of the property and recovery of attorneys’
fees and court costs. In re Matravers, 149 B.R. 204
(Bankr. D. Utah 1993).
The debtors’ Chapter 13 plan was confirmed with the
confirmation order stating that discharge was to occur upon
completion of the plan. During the plan period, the debtors
were late on several plan payments to the IRS and the IRS
levied against the debtors’ property. The debtors sought
recovery of the levied property, arguing that the levies
violated the automatic stay. The court noted that the
automatic stay normally terminates upon confirmation of a
Chapter 13 plan because confirmation normally acts to
discharge the debtors; however, because the debtors’
confirmation order delayed discharge until completion of
the plan, the automatic stay remained in effect.  The court
held that the levies were violations of the automatic stay but
denied recovery because the amounts levied were owed by
the debtors under the plan. In re Reisher, 149 B.R. 372
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1992).
PLAN. Although required by local bankruptcy rules to
provide notice to the IRS at a certain address, the debtor
failed to provide notice of the final confirmation hearing or
to serve a copy of the confirmation order to the correct IRS
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office.  The debtor sought turnover of amounts paid to the
IRS during the bankruptcy case in excess of the IRS claim.
The court held that although the IRS eventually had notice
of the confirmation order and failed to object, the IRS was
not bound by the order because the debtor failed to serve
notice to the correct address. In re Griffin Oil Co., Inc.,
149 B.R. 419 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1992).
PRIORITY.  The debtor was assessed a Section 72(t)
10 percent penalty for early withdrawal from pension and
profit sharing plans.  The court held that the penalty was a
nonpecuniary loss penalty not entitled to priority payment
under the debtor's Chapter 11 plan.  In re Cassidy, 983
F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1992), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec. aff’g,
126 B.R. 94 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
TAX LIENS. At the filing of the bankruptcy petition,
the debtor owned an interest in an ERISA-qualified pension
plan. The court held that the plan was not estate property
but that the debtor’s interest in the plan remained subject to
bankruptcy court jurisdiction.  The court also held that the
pre-petition federal tax lien attached to the debtor’s interest
in the plan as of the date of the petition. In re Anderson,
149 B.R. 591 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1992).
CONTRACTS
ANTICIPATORY BREACH. In April 1988, the
plaintiff entered into a written contract with the defendant
to purchase dry edible navy beans from the defendant at the
end of the harvest in 1988. The contract provided two
payment options and an employee of the plaintiff
inadvertently filled out both options. In May 1988, the
defendant told the plaintiff to tear up the contract, although
the plaintiff disputed that the statement was ever made. The
issue was whether the plaintiff was entitled to the difference
in the contract price and the cover price at the time of the
anticipatory breach or at the time of intended performance
of the contract.  The court held that because U.C.C. § 2-610
allowed an aggrieved party a commercially reasonable time
to await performance before suspending performance or
seeking a remedy, the defendant was entitled to the
difference in the contract price of beans and the market
value at the time of the anticipatory breach. The jury found
that the repudiation of the contract by the defendant
occurred in May 1988 when the market and contract prices
for the beans were the same. Trinidad Bean & Elevator
Co. v. Frosh, 494 N.W.2d 347 (Neb. Ct. App. 1992).
CONSIDERATION. In an attempt to avoid foreclosure
against the plaintiff’s farm, the plaintiff attempted to sell
some land against which the defendant held a junior lien.
The defendant initially agreed to release its lien but later
refused to release the lien unless it received a portion of the
proceeds. When the plaintiff sued for breach of contract, the
defendant argued that no contract existed because no
consideration was to be given by the plaintiff for the
defendant’s release of the lien. The plaintiff argued that the
payment of the proceeds on the first mortgage would be a
benefit to the defendant.  The court held that the plaintiff’s
obligation to make payments on the loans was a pre-
existing obligation which could not be used as new
consideration for  the defendant’s release of the lien. In re
Bennett, 149 B.R. 16 (N.D. N.Y. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CONVERSION. The defendant was convicted of
conversion resulting from the sale without permission of
grain which was collateral for a federal farm program loan.
The issue was the amount of loss involved so as to
determine the enhancement level of the offense for
sentencing purposes. The defendant argued that only the
loss relating to the counts to which the defendant pled
guilty could be included. The court held that the losses
relating to the dismissed counts would be included because
the amounts resulted from conduct related to the criminal
conduct to which the defendant pled guilty. U.S. v. Redlin,
983 F.2d 893 (8th Cir. 1993).
GUARANTEED LOANS. The plaintiff bank made a
loan to the farm debtors who applied for an FmHA
guarantee of the loan. The FmHA and bank agreement for
the loan guarantee required the bank to release all prior
security interests and to apply all payments from the
debtors on the guaranteed loan before making any
payments on other loans to the debtors made by the bank.
The debtor signed up for the Dairy Termination Program
and sold all cattle. The debtor remitted the proceeds of the
sale of the cattle and the program payments to the bank
which applied only the proceeds of the sale of the cattle
against the guaranteed loan.  After the debtors were
discharged in bankruptcy, the bank filed a claim with the
FmHA for the losses on the guaranteed loan. The court held
that the FmHA denial of the claim was proper because the
bank failed to apply all payments against the guaranteed
loan first. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. U.S., 27 Fed. Cl.
403 (1992).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS. The
decedent died in 1969 and the decedent’s will created a
residuary trust for the surviving spouse. The trustee had the
power to distribute trust corpus to the surviving spouse and
the descendants of the decedent. The children of the
decedent proposed to obtain a state court order of their
disclaimer of any right to the trust corpus.  The disclaimer
also included the children’s current and future heirs. It was
unknown whether the disclaimer would be effective under
local law to bind the descendants of the children. The IRS
ruled that because the disclaimer of the children was
untimely, the disclaimer, if effective under local law, would
be a gift to the remainder interest holders and an addition to
the trust, subjecting the trust to GSTT when any
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distributions were made to skip persons. Even if the
disclaimer was not effective, a gift would be made unless a
descendant successfully challenged the disclaimer within 9
months after reaching majority. Ltr. Rul. 9308007, Nov.
24, 1992.
The decedent died in 1956 and the decedent’s will
established a trust for each of two daughters. Each trust
provided that upon the death of the daughter, the trust
passed to the daughter’s children, with further remainders
to the children’s issue.  If a daughter died without issue, the
trust property passed to the other trust. One daughter had
only adopted children and the state law at the time of the
decedent’s death did not included adopted children in the
definition of children for probate purposes.  Therefore, in
1982, the two daughters entered into an agreement to treat
the daughter’s adopted children as natural children. Because
one of the natural children was a minor, the agreement was
reexecuted in 1986 when the child reached its majority. The
IRS ruled that the 1982 agreement resulted in gifts to the
first daughter’s trust to the extent of the value of their
release to the adopted children of the first daughter of their
rights in the remainder of the daughter’s trust. These gifts
were not subject to GSTT because they were made before
enactment of the GSTT. However, the 1986 agreement
resulted in a gift from the minor child and caused an
addition to the first trust, subjecting that trust to GSTT to
the extent of that gift. Ltr. Rul. 9308032, Nov. 30, 1992.
GIFT. The taxpayer and the taxpayer’s children formed
a limited partnership with the taxpayer contributing
$750,000 in exchange fore a one percent general
partnership interest and a 98 percent limited partnership
interest. The children each contributed $50 for a .00661
limited partnership interest. The taxpayer transferred most
of the taxpayer’s limited partnership interests to the
children and a trust for grandchildren. A document entitled
“Gift of Limited Partnership Interest” gave the limited
partnership interests a stated value.  The document also
provided that if the value of a donated partnership interest
should be valued differently by an agreed settlement of a
bona fide dispute or by a court judgment in a bona fide
dispute, the value so determined should control. The
taxpayer argued that the transfer of the limited partnership
interest was not subject to gift tax because the gifts were
incomplete since the amount of each partnership interest
could be changed by the taxpayers bringing a court action
to determine the value of the interests. The IRS ruled that
because the taxpayer or donees were unlikely to challenge
the value of the interests, the transfers were completed gifts
subject to a condition subsequent, similar to the clause in
Commissioner v. Proctor, 142 F.2d 824 (4th Cir. 1944) and
the value of the limited partnership interests were not
limited to the value stated in the transfer agreement. Ltr.
Rul. 9309001, Sept. 30, 1992.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX.
The decedent owned interests, either personally or through
partnerships or corporations, in residential and commercial
rental properties.  The decedent, either personally or
through the entities, actively managed and maintained the
properties, performing various services for the tenants.  The
partnerships and corporations all had 15 or fewer partners
or shareholders. The IRS ruled that the decedent’s interests
qualified as interests in closely held businesses and the
estate was eligible for installment payment of estate tax.
Ltr. Rul. 9309015, Dec. 1, 1992.
STEP-UP IN BASIS .  One month prior to the
decedent’s death, the decedent and surviving spouse
established a revocable trust for the benefit of the decedent
and spouse. The survivor received the entire trust upon the
death of the other beneficiary. The trust provided that either
beneficiary could revoke the trust and allowed each
beneficiary to file a written election to have taxes, debts and
expenses of the first beneficiary to die to be paid from the
trust. The trust, and therefore the election, could not be
revoked by the surviving beneficiary after the death of the
other beneficiary. The IRS ruled that because the surviving
spouse had the power to revoke the trust during the year
before the death of the decedent, the surviving spouse could
not increase the basis of the property to the estate tax value,
even though all of the trust property was included in the
decedent’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9308002, Nov. 16, 1992.
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH.  The decedent had established a revocable trust
under which the decedent had the authority to direct the
trust to distribute income and corpus. The decedent was the
sole income and principal beneficiary of the trust whether
or not the decedent was incompetent. The decedent made
gifts from the trust and after the decedent became
incompetent, the decedent’s guardian continued the patern
of making gifts from the trust up to the date of the
decedent’s death. The IRS ruled that the gifts from the trust
were properly characterized as withdrawals for the
decedent’s benefit followed by transfers to the donees.
Therefore, the transfers within three years before the
decedent’s death were not included in the decedent’s gross
estate.  Ltr. Rul. 9309003, Nov. 13, 1992.
TRUSTS. The decedent was a beneficiary of three
trusts established by predeceased parents. The remainder
beneficiaries were three children of the decedent and the
trustees sought to have the three trusts administered as nine
separate trusts, three for each child. The court held that
because the original grantors had established separate trusts
for the decedent and had granted the trustees discretion in
administering the trusts, the administration of the trusts as
nine separate trusts was allowed. John L. Dickinson
Testamentary Trust v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-62.
VALUATION. The taxpayer established a charitable
remainder unitrust for each of five of the grantor’s children.
Each trust provides for an 8 percent of net value annual
distribution, payable quarterly to the grantor, with the same
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amount payable to the grantor’s spouse upon the grantor’s
death, and payable to the grantor’s child upon the death of
the grantor and spouse. After the death of the child, the trust
property passes to charitable organizations. The grantor
retained the right to remove the unitrust interests of the
spouse and child by will. The grantor released this right.
The IRS ruled that the value of the unitrust amounts would
be valued under I.R.C. § 7520. The ruling sets forth the
unitrust factor for each unitrust holder. Ltr. Rul. 9309041,
Dec. 8, 1992.
In order to reduce the state franchise tax which was
based on the number of authorized shares of a corporation,
the corporation decreased the number of shares of
authorized common and preferred stock but increased the
par value of each share proportionately such that the total
capitalization of the corporation remained the same and the
value of each shareholder’s total stock holding remained
the same. Thus, the one million shares of preferred stock
with a par value of $10 were reduced to 10,000 shares with
a par value of $1,000. Each share of preferred and common
stock carried one vote before and after the change. The IRS
ruled that the change was not subject to the valuation rules
of I.R.C. §§ 2701, 2704. Ltr. Rul. 9309018, Dec. 3, 1992.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C O O P E R A T I V E S . An exempt Section 521
agricultural marketing cooperative imported a portion of a
raw product to meet the emergency needs of the
cooperative and its members. The cooperative paid customs
duty on the imported product.  The cooperative entered into
an agreement with a third party corporation under which the
corporation would import a quantity of the same raw
product, refine the product and re-export the product,
enabling the cooperative to obtain a “drawback” of the
custom duties paid on the raw product imported by the
cooperative. The transaction was a “paper” transaction as to
the cooperative which took no possession or ownership of
the imported and exported products.  The “drawback” was
treated as a partial recovery of previous marketing
expenses.  The “drawback” amount was less than one-tenth
of one percent of the total earnings of the cooperative.  The
IRS ruled that the agreement would not affect the exempt
status of the cooperative because the amount of the
drawback was de minimis and the transaction was a limited,
one-time occurrence.  Ltr. Rul. 9309012, Dec. 1, 1992.
ESTIMATED TAXES. The IRS has announced that
the following lines of Worksheet 2.7 “Estimated Tax
Worksheet Limiting Use of Prior Year’s Tax,” in IRS Pub.
505 should not be filed in: Line 6, columns a, c, and d; Line
7, columns b, c, and d; Lines 9-15, column a; and Line 18,
column a.  The announcement includes a copy of the
corrected worksheet. Ann. 93-35, I.R.B. 1993-9, 43.
PARTNERSHIPS
DEFINITION. The taxpayers formed a limited liability
company (LLC) under a state law which provided that the
death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy or
dissolution of a member caused a termination of the LLC.
The LLC agreement provided that all members must
consent to any transfer of an interest in the LLC. The IRS
ruled that the LLC lacked continuity of life and free
transferability of interests and was classified as a
partnership for federal tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9308027,
Nov. 27, 1992.
The IRS ruled that a business organized under the
Virginia Limited Liability Company Act  was classified as
a partnership for federal tax purposes. Ltr. Rul. 9308039,
Dec. 2, 1992.
PENSION PLANS. For plans beginning in February
1993, the weighted average is 8.04 percent with the
permissible range of 7.24 to 8.85 percent for purposes of
determining the full funding limitation under I.R.C. §
412(c)(7).  Notice 93-13, I.R.B. 1993-9, 40.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced a new Form 9465
“Installment Agreement Request,” for taxpayers who want
to request installment payment of their 1992 tax during
1993. Installment payment of taxes is subject to interest and
late payment penalties. IR 93-25, March 3, 1993.
S CORPORATIONS.
MERGER. An S corporation reorganized in a merger
qualified under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(F) into a business trust
which qualified as an association for federal tax purposes.
The IRS ruled that the S corporation status was not lost
because of the reorganization and that the accumulated
adjustments account carried over to the new business trust.
In addition, the original corporation’s holding period for its
assets carried over to the new trust and the trust could use
the old corporation’s identification number. Ltr. Rul.
9309031, Dec. 4, 1992.
ONE CLASS OF STOCK. An S corporation obtained
several loans from another corporation, two shareholders,
and two shareholders and other individuals. The obligations
provided for market rate of interest, a regular payment
schedule and nonconvertibility of the obligations. The
corporation also entered into shareholder agreements which
included buy-sell agreements, redemptions agreements, an
option plan for employees, put-call agreements and
employee agreements.  In the various agreements, the price
of any stock involved would be determined at fair market
value and the agreements resulted from arms-length
negotiations. The IRS ruled that the shareholder agreements
and corporate obligations were not second classes of stock.
Ltr. Rul. 9308006, Nov. 24, 1992.
SHAREHOLER’S BASIS. The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder of an S corporation and cosigned and
guaranteed a note given by the S corporation. The note was
secured by a deed of trust on the property purchased with
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the loan proceeds. The corporation made all payments on
the note. The lender obtained no financial statement from
the taxpayer and no liens were placed on the taxpayer’s
property to secure the note. The court held that taxpayer’s
basis in the stock in the corporation was not increased by
the taxpayer’s guarantee of the obligation. Keech v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-71.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
APRIL 1993
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 3.75 3.72 3.70 3.69
110% AFR 4.13 4.09 4.07 4.06
120% AFR 4.51 4.46 4.44 4.42
Mid-term
AFR 5.45 5.38 5.34 5.32
110% AFR 6.01 5.92 5.88 5.85
120% AFR 6.56 6.46 6.41 6.37
Long-term
AFR 6.52 6.42 6.37 6.34
110% AFR 7.18 7.06 7.00 6.96
120% AFR 7.85 7.70 7.63 7.58
TAX LIENS.  The debtor had assigned to a secured
creditor the proceeds of oil and gas produced on property
owned by the debtor.  The oil and gas had been pledged as
security for a loan and the proceeds from the oil and gas
were credited against the loan. The IRS filed a tax lien
against the real property after the creditor’s security interest
was perfected  and after the assignment. The IRS attempted
to levy against the proceeds when the creditor received
them. The court held that the creditor’s security interest had
priority and that the tax lien could not attach to the proceeds
because the debtor’s interest in them was unvested and
contingent until the oil and gas were actually produced. In
re Hawn, 149 B.R. 450 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993).
LABOR
EMPLOYER LIABILITY. The plaintiff was an
employee of the defendant and worked as a laborer on the
defendant’s farm. The plaintiff was injured when the
plaintiff attempted to lower the tongue of an upturned feed
wagon by climbing onto the tongue. The plaintiff slipped
and fell and sued the defendant for negligence in failing to
warn other employees not to load the wagon while
disconnected from the tractor. The court upheld a summary
judgment for the defendant, holding that the upturned
wagon did not present any hidden danger and that the
plaintiff was injured through the plaintiff’s own voluntary
action in climbing onto the wagon tongue with muddy feet.
Farmer v. Heard, 844 S.W.2d 425 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992).
MORTGAGES
BORROWER’S RIGHTS. The plaintiff’s predecessor
in interest loaned money to the defendant partnership and
when the defendant defaulted on loan payments, the
plaintiff brought a foreclosure action against farm land
owned by the defendant. The defendant argued that notice
served on it was defective under Minn. Stat. § 582.042
because the defendant was a family farm. The court held
that the defendant was not entitled to the notice
requirements because (1) neither the partnership nor any of
its members lived on the farm land, (2) the farm land was
cash rented, and (3) the partnership had no income from the
sale of farm products in the taxable year before the
foreclosure action was filed. Resolution Trust Corp. v.
Lipton, 983 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1993).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
CONSERVATION RESERVE PAYMENTS. A
creditor argued that its security interest in the debtor’s farm
products included the debtor’s rights to Conservation
Reserve Program payments. The court held that the creditor
did not have a security interest in the CRP payments
because the payments were rent and considered real
property. In addition, the court held that the creditor’s
security interest was not perfected because the financing
statement was filed with the county recorder instead of the
Secretary of State. In re Zweygardt, 149 B.R. 673 (D.
Kan. 1992).
INSURANCE PROCEEDS. The plaintiff rented farm
land to the defendant and helped the defendant obtain crop
financing by lending the defendant money. The defendant
also borrowed money from the FmHA and the FmHA
agreed to subordinate its security interest in the defendant’s
crops to the security interest of the plaintiff.  The FmHA
required the defendant to obtain crop insurance and the
defendant assigned the right to the proceeds to the FmHA.
The plaintiff’s security agreement only required the
defendant to obtain insurance if required by the plaintiff,
but the plaintiff did not require insurance on the crops. The
plaintiff sought recovery of the crop insurance proceeds as
subject to the superior security interest. The court held that
under Zorba’s Inn, Inc. v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
377 S.E.2d 797 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989), the plaintiff’s security
interest did not attach to the insurance proceeds because
neither the security agreement nor the plaintiff required the
defendant to obtain insurance and to assign the proceeds to
the plaintiff. Lyon v. May, 424 S.E.2d 655 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993).
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R E C E I V E R S . Prior to the debtor’s filing for
bankruptcy, a receiver was appointed to operate the
debtor’s orchards.  During the receiver’s tenure, the
receiver treated tree stakes with various chemicals and used
other chemicals in spraying the trees. Each year, the
receiver obtained state court approval for its operation of
the orchards.  After the debtor filed for bankruptcy and a
trustee was appointed to operate the business, the receiver
applied for recovery of costs and expenses it incurred in the
previous year. The trustee and creditors sought to charge
against the receiver the costs of cleaning up the soil from
contamination from the chemicals used by the receiver.
The court held that the receiver was not liable to the
bankruptcy estate for tortious acts performed within its
authority and that the receiver had derivative judicial
immunity from liability under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
as well as the Washington Model Toxic Control Act and
Hazardous Waste Management Act. In re Sundance
Corp., Inc., 149 B.R. 641 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
Litwin v. U.S., 983 F.2d 987 (10th Cir. 1993), aff’g,
91-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,229 (D. Kan. 1991) (bad
debt deduction), see p. 41 supra.
McCabe Packing Co v. U.S., 809 F. Supp. 614 (C.D.
Ill. 1992) (constructive dividends), see p. 41 supra.
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy send a check for $115 to Agricultural
Law Press, P.O. Box 5444, Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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